Häckner (2000) shows that in a differentiated oligopoly with more than two firms , prices may be higher under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition, implying that the classical result of Singh and Vives (1984) that Bertrand prices are always lower than Cournot prices is sensitive to the duopoly assumption. Häckner (2000), however, le aves unanswered the important question of whether welfare may be lower under price competition. This note shows that in Häckner's model both consumer surplus and total surplus are higher under price competition than under quantity competition regardless of whether goods are substitutes or complements.
Introduction
In their classical paper, Singh and Vives (1984) show that in a differentiated duopoly with linear demands and constant marginal costs both consumer surplus and total surplus (the sum of consumer surplus and total industry profit) are higher under Bertrand price competition than under Cournot quantity competition regardless of whether goods are substitutes or complements. This result is due to their established result that quantities are lower and prices higher in Cournot than in Bertrand competition, and the facts that consumer surplus is decreasing and convex in prices and that total surplus is increasing and concave in quantities. In a recent paper, Häckner (2000) shows that in a differentiated oligopoly with more than two firms and vertical quality differentiation, prices may be higher under price competition than under quantity competition, implying that Singh and Vives' results on prices and quantities are sensitive to the duopoly assumption. However, Häckner (2000) leaves unanswered the important question of whether welfare may be lower under price competition than under quantity competition.
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This note shows that in Häckner's model both consumer surplus and total surplus are higher under price competition than under quantity competition regardless of whether goods are substitutes or complements. Thus Singh and Vives' conclusion on welfare continues to hold in Häckner's oligopolistic model . While uniform ranking of prices between Bertrand and Cournot competition guarantees a definitive ranking on welfare, it is not necessary. In Häckner's model, Bertrand prices can be higher than Cournot prices but this happens only for low-quality firms and when quality differences across firms are large. Both conditions imply that the low-quality firms have less significant effects on the overall welfare. Indeed, it is shown in the following that price reversal for low-quality firms is never significant enough to make welfare smaller under Bertrand than under Cournot competition.
1 Indeed, Häckner (2000) states that "The welfare issue becomes too complex in a general setting" (p. 233).
The Häckner Model
Häckner (2000) considers an n-firm (n ≥ 3) differentiated goods oligopoly model with quality differentiation that is a direct generalization of the duopoly model developed by Dixit (1979) . For convenience, the same notation as in Häckner (2000) is adopted here. There is a representative consumer with the following quasi-linear utility function:
In (1) 
Let n i i1 ()/n = α=α ∑ denote the average product quality. Using the inverse demand system (2) and assuming all firms produce at zero costs, Häckner (2000) derived the Cournot equilibrium prices and quantities for firm k, given by
and the Bertrand equilibrium prices and quantities for firm k, given by
B kk
Here, (3)- (5) are expressed in a form that will facilitate later calculations. As can be seen from (3)- (5), equilibrium prices and quantities for each good k are linear combinations of the average quality and the difference between good k's quality and the average quality. These relationships will help us to express both consumer surplus and total surplus as linear combinations of the average quality squared and the variance of product quality.
Bertrand vs. Cournot: Welfare Comparison
Let α = 1n (,,) αα L denote the quality vector and A the following nn × matrix:
Then the representative consumer's utility function (1) can be rewritten as U(q, I) = α q' − qAq'/2+I
and the maximizing conditions (2) can be rewritten as p = α − qA, where p = 1n (p,,p) L is the price vector. Hence consumer surplus (CS) is given by CS = U(q, I)− ( pq'+I) = qAq'/2.
Applying to this expression the matrix identity that A = (1) −γ I n + γ 1 n where I n is the nn × identity matrix and 1 n is the nn × matrix of all 1's, one obtains Substituting these into (6) gives the consumer surplus under Cournot competition:
where
is the variance of product quality. Similarly, by use of (5) 
Total surplus (TS) is the sum of consumer surplus and total industry profit (
By utilizing (3), the total profit under Cournot competition is
By use of (4) and (5), the total profit under Bertrand competition is
Summing (7) and (9) gives the total surplus under Cournot competition
Summing (8) and (10) 
The preceding expressions indicate that both consumer surplus and total surplus are expressible as linear combinations of the variance of product quality and the average quality squared.
The following proposition shows that both coefficients in these linear combinations are greater under
Bertrand than under Cournot competition, resulting in larger consumer surplus and total surplus under Bertrand than under Cournot competition. Proposition 1. Consumer surplus and total surplus are higher under Bertrand than under Cournot competition regardless of whether goods are substitutes or complements; they are equal in Bertrand and Cournot competition when goods are independent.
Proof. As in Häckner (2000), we assume that 1/(n1) γ>−− , i.e., the second-order condition for an interior solution under Bertrand competition holds.
2 Consider first consumer surplus. Taking the difference between (7) and (8) n (n1)(3n5)2(2n5)4(2n7n5)2(3n5) subinterval for all n ≥ 3. Hence, the second numerator in the above braces is negative provided that 1/(n1) γ>−− and n ≥ 3. We have thus shown that CB TSTS − < 0 except when γ = 0, in which case the difference is equal to zero.
Discussion
Häckner (2000) shows that, in a differentiated goods oligopoly with three or more firms, if quality differences are large and goods are complementary low-quality firms may charge higher prices under Bertrand than under Cournot competition. The reason for this result is the asymmetric effects that switching from quantity to price competition has on firms of different qualities. Compared to quantity competition, prices are lower and demands higher for high-qua lity producers (i.e., the large firms) under price competition. With complementary goods and a substitution rate that is uniform across all goods, the demand for low-quality goods may become so high under price competition that it enables low-quality producers to charge prices that are higher than those under quantity competit ion. 
